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The sex/gender distinction first originated from American psychoanalyst Robert Stoller’s 
1968 book Sex and Gender: The Development of Masculinity and Femininity. In the decades that 
followed, second wave feminist scholars appropriated and redeployed Stoller’s distinction 
towards an end of combating biological essentialism. Contemporaneously, the sex/gender 
distinction has undergone a conceptual reorientation towards creating two specific sets of 
occupiable positions for both gender and sex. 
Thesis Statement 
The disruptive effects of dissemination on the constitutive aspects of gender and sex 
result in these two concepts conflating. On account of this conflation, the sex/gender distinction 
of feminist theory collapses into untenability. 
Theoretical Framework 
This project utilizes textual analysis and conceptual analysis. Through textual analysis I 
evaluate the texts of feminist theory and a variety of other disciplines. Through conceptual 
analysis I interrogating a number of key concepts pertaining to these aforementioned disciplines. 
2 
Project Description 
In many strains of contemporary feminist theory, the sex/gender distinction is an 
elementary conception. Across its decades of paradigmatic prevalence within the discipline, the 
distinction consistently contextualizes the category of gender as segregating by a dynamic of 
psychology/culture and the category of sex as segregating by a dynamic of biology. The 
sex/gender distinction, however, is ultimately untenable a conceptual structure. While other 
scholars have previously asserted this claim, this particular project puts forth an original critique 
incorporative of French poststructuralist Jacques Derrida’s notion of dissemination. 
In a general sense, dissemination prevents the meaning of signifiers from being restrained 
to an insular context. Accordingly, dissemination disrupts any conceptual schema that 
operationally requires contextual stabilization. The sex/gender distinction, being such a schema, 
falls into disarray as effected by disseminative disruptions. Disruption occurs in two ways. First, 
dissemination causes segregative conflation between the dynamics of both gender and sex, 
resulting in these categories coming to divide indistinguishably from each other. Second, 
dissemination conflates the individuated positions of gender and sex (e.g. man, woman, male, 
female) into a dual occupancy under both categories, resulting in an indistinguishability of 
categorized positional specificity. By the factor of both of these disruptions, the sex/gender 
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Lay perspectives hide insights that can shatter orthodox paradigms. The unlearned 
understanding of the relationship between gender and sex exemplifies this notion brilliantly. 
Within contemporary feminist scholarship, it is an elementary principle that the concept of ‘sex’ 
is distinct from the concept of ‘gender’.1 To postulate to the contrary, as by an unhesitant 
conflation of the two concepts, indicates to scholars a lack of theoretical knowledge and a 
belonging to the laity.2 Given closer examination, however, this supposedly naive postulation of 
equivalency schematizes the relation between gender and sex more keenly than the dualistic 
model propped up by academic feminism. When put under scrutiny, the sex/gender distinction is 
revealed as untenable. The established perimeters said to divide the concepts, those being the 
‘biological’ for ‘sex’ and the ‘social’/‘psychological’ for ‘gender’, fail at their segregative 
function to such an extent that currently all subject positions figured as belonging to the category 
of gender are present equally in the category of sex, and all subject positions figured as 
belonging to the category of sex are present equally in the category of gender.3 An utter 
conceptual collapse follows from this absolute overlap accordingly. Out of this absolute overlap 
comes a complete conceptual collapse. While a rejective account of the sex/gender distinction is 
in no sense itself revolutionary, this particular project stands individuated from past critiques on 
the basis of primary two factors.4 First, it seeks to dismantle the distinction in its most 
                                                 
1 Alison Stone, An Introduction to Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 30.  
2 Mari Mikkola, “Ontological Commitments, Sex and Gender,” in Feminist Metaphysics: Explorations in Ontology 
of Sex, Gender and the Self, ed. Charlotte Witt (Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer, 2011), 69.  
3 Stone, 30. 
4 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London & New York: Routledge, 1990); 
Mikkola, “Ontological Commitments, Sex and Gender”; Raia Prokhovnik, Rational Woman: A Feminist Critique of 
Dichotomy (London & New York: Routledge, 1999). 
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contemporaneously constructed schematization, and second, it does so through a novel 
application of Jacque Derrida’s quasi-concept of ‘dissemination’. In addition to these primary 
factors, the project also proposes the remedial neologism of ‘gendersex’ as a responsive 







Prior to detailing the problematic aspects and inherent deficiencies of the sex/gender 
distinction, it is first necessary to outline its origin, conceptual scheme, and functionality within 
key theoretical contexts. While the notion that ‘sex’ refers directly to a human status has been a 
constant since the 18th century, it was not until the 1960s that this same notion became equally 
applicable to ‘gender’; up until then, gender was strictly a grammatical term relating to noun 
distinguishment within a number of Romance languages.5 The ideas articulated by American 
psychoanalyst Robert Stoller in this decade ultimately mark both the development of gender into 
a realm of human categorization and, by consequence, the distinction of this new realm from that 
of sex. Stoller’s conception of the sex/gender distinction can be summarized as follows: sex 
pertains to differentiations of biologically contingent factors, while gender pertains to 
differentiations of culturally and psychologically contingent factors.6 Expanding further upon the 
constitution of the former, corporeal features including chromosomes, genitalia, gonads, 
hormonal levels, and post-puberty physiological changes all contribute to the characterization of 
one’s sex, and thus figure one’s placement within this realm as an immutable product of nature.7 
‘Male’ and ‘female’ operate as the validated positions of sex.8 Regarding gender, the basis for its 
constitution is somewhat more opaque than its biological counterpart. Stoller describes gender in 
                                                 
5 Thomas Laquer, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge & London: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 7-8; Jennifer Germon, Gender: A Genealogy of an Idea, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), 1. 
6 Robert Stoller, Sex and Gender: The Development of Masculinity and Femininity (London: Karnac Books, 1968), 
9. 
7 Stoller, 9; Prokhovnik, 111. 
8 Stoller, 9. 
7 
very vague terms as “the amount of masculinity or femininity found in a person.”9 Granting 
some greater clarity to concept, the psychoanalyst gives two further facets of gender 
corresponding to the twofoldness of its characterization. These facets are those of ‘gender 
identity’ and ‘gender role’. Through gender identity, one obtains a self-conscious awareness of 
occupying a specific gendered position, and, subsequently, said position becomes posited as a 
core element of one’s own psyche.10 As for gender roles, these are described in Stoller’s own 
words as, “the overt behavior one displays in society, the role which he [sic] plays, especially 
with other people, to establish his position with them insofar as his and their evaluation of his 
gender is concerned.”11 
 In the years following Stoller’s initial schematization, the sex/gender distinction gained 
extensive traction within the context of feminist theory. However, the theoretical model 
appropriated out of Stoller’s framework by no means assumed a stabilized and universally 
adapted structural configuration. Toril Moi describes two disparate ways the distinction can be 
modeled,  
The sex/gender distinction operates on two different levels: on a general social level, where 
gender becomes synonymous with social norms or ideology and sex means concrete human 
bodies; and on an individual level, where gender gets interpreted as personal identity or 
subjectivity, and sex is imagined to be an elusive entity inside or beyond the actual body.12  
 
Following Moi, conceptualizing the sex/gender distinction may take either a wide-lensed 
approach in which its total effects on a society are taken under consideration, or a narrowed 
approach in which its effects are considered as divisionarily pertaining to individual. This 
socially oriented understanding will be referred to as the ‘macro model’, while the individual-
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Stoller, 10, 29-30. 
11 Ibid., 10. 
12 Toril Moi, What Is A Woman?: and Other Essays, (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 32-33. 
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oriented understanding will be referred to as the ‘micro model’. The former of the two 
conceptualizations was the first to be developed from Stoller’s ideas and had by the 1970s 
reached paradigmatic status within the discourse of second wave feminism.13 By this socially 
oriented model of the sex/gender distinction, as aptly described in the words of Teresa de 
Lauretis, “gender is not sex, a state of nature, but the representation of each individual in terms 
of a social relation which pre-exists the individual and is predicated on the conceptual and rigid 
(structural) opposition of two biological sexes.”14 By the postulations of biological determinism, 
the constraints of the social milieu binding both males to masculinity and females to femininity 
are contingent upon the concrete anatomical differences between the sexes, thus negating any 
possibility to alter or escape from these positional roles.15 Feminists unsurprisingly found this 
notion of societal rigidness objectionable on account of it essentializing a hierarchy that 
subordinated the female to the male—or, as equivalently read, ‘woman to man’—for the first 
distinction model deemed all subject positions as belonging to sex, so each of these pairs are 
interchangeably iterable.16 Accordingly, the sex/gender distinction was deployed as a counter 
measure to the misogyny behind the essentialist framework. In compartmentalizing the 
biological into sex and the cultural into gender, feminists unlinked anatomical differentiation 
from determining the stifling aspects of femininity and masculinity. To extrapolate, while indeed 
as belonging to sex, males and females were figured as biologically disparate, this disparity was 
not itself responsible for the presence of social inequality; hierarchization emerged, rather, out of 
                                                 
13 David Haig, “The Inexorable Rise of Gender and the Decline of Sex: Social Change in Academic Titles, 1945–
2001,” in Archives of Sexual Behavior 33, no. 2 (2004), 93; Stone, 31. 
14 Teresa de Lauretis, Technologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film, and Fiction (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indianapolis University Press, 1987), 5.  
15 Stone, 31. 
16 Moi, 30. 
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culturally generated gender roles enforced upon the two positions of the sexes.17 Under this 
socially oriented model of the sex/gender distinction, thusly, the positing of gender roles upon 
the sexes affirmed the possibility of manifesting an egalitarian relationality between woman and 
man despite their anatomical dissimilarities. 
  
  
                                                 




THE MICRO MODEL’S ONSET 
 
 
While in the era of second wave feminism the macro model served as the dominant form 
of the sex/gender distinction, its prevalence of usage within feminist theory has since diminished 
considerably.18 In its place, the other model of the sex/gender distinction, that more individual-
oriented micro level model, has superseded its way into greater popularity within present day 
scholarship. A fully detailed account outlining the half a century shift from the macro model to 
the micro model far exceeds the viable breadth of analysis for this project. Said shift could very 
easily be the topic of its own separate treatise. The onset of queer theory, changes in the regime’s 
psycho-medical institutions, and the rise of identity politics under neoliberalism have all been 
pegged as culpable, but these in no sense are exhaustive of the factors involved.19 Trajectories of 
transformation aside, the dynamics of gender and sex at play in the individually oriented model 
vastly differ from those of its socially oriented counterpart. By the schematizations of the macro 
model, gender’s effect pertained to the relational differences manifested out of masculinity and 
femininity upon the whole of social subjects. On account of relationality serving as a basis here, 
gender itself lacked an ontological foundation. One could not be a gender, only constrained by 
the broader roles dictated by its systemization. Ontological fundament, rather, fell upon the sex 
side of the distinction. Hence, all foundational positions of the macro model (e.g. man, woman, 
female, male), were predicated upon what was figured as natural biological differences between 
                                                 
18 Sheila Jeffreys, Gender Hurts: A feminist analysis of the politics of transgenderism (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 4-5. 
19 Jeffreys, 40-45; Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London & New 
York: Routledge, 1991), 133; Marie Moran, Identity & Capitalism (Los Angeles, London, New Deli, Singapore, 
Washington DC: Sage, 2015), 111-112.  
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bodies. In great contrast to the macro model, the divisionary function of the sex/gender 
distinction serves no longer under this new micro model to map out the gendered social 
impositions of femininity and masculinity upon their corresponding sexes of male (man) and 
female (woman). It instead serves to map out how the positions of sex and the positions of 
gender qualitatively operate in tandem at the level of the single individual. Summarized 
succinctly in the words of Mari Mikkola regarding what occurs from this shift, “‘woman’ and 
‘man’ are used as gender terms, ‘female’ and ‘male’ as sex terms… Being a human female 
doesn’t make one a woman. Instead, in order to satisfy the gender concept ‘woman’ some social, 
not biological, conditions must be met.”20 Thus, within each human exist both characteristics 
situating one as a particular gender and characteristics situating one as a particular sex. 
 To assist in us in better understanding the workings of the micro model, this project will 
heavily exemplify its schematization by Sam Killermann, most recognized as the creator of the 
Genderbread Person, a pedagogical device for mapping out the differences between gender 
identity, gender expression, sex, and attraction. Despite being strictly an activist, and therefore 
not the most academic of sources, two factors make Killermann nevertheless worth scrutinizing. 
First, qualified academics frequently incorporate the Genderbread Person, and thus the ideas it 
espouses, into the lesson plans of introductory gender studies courses (I myself was exposed to 
the Genderbread Person in my own Intro to Women’s and Gender Studies class). Killermann’s 
lack of verified academic credential then proves ultimately negligible in the face of those who 
are verified affirmingly teaching the activist’s ideas in a institutionally legitimate setting. 
Second, the sheer degree of the device’s virality beyond even the academy, the Genderbread 
Person has over a billion downloads as an image by the activist’s own data, qualifies it as the 
                                                 
20 Mari Mikkola, “Gender Concepts and Intuitions,” in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, no. 4 (2009), 560. 
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most currently popular representation of the individual-oriented sex/gender distinction.21 The 
ideas of none other convey such a simplified folk understanding of how this model is widely 
understood. These factors prefaced, our attention can return now to investigating both the micro 
model in question and the way Killermann iterates its conceptualization. 
Not all facets of the Genderbread Person relate substantially to Killermann’s portrayal of 
the sex/gender distinction, and as such only the relevant categorical aspects of the device, these 
being sex and gender identity, will be given attention here. Because all of categories themselves 
are “interrelated, but not necessarily interconnected,” Killermann’s views are not misrepresented 
by these omissions.22 So beginning with sex, the functionality of this category operates by many 
measures in the exact same way as it did under the socially oriented model. Both its ties to the 
realm of biology remain completely unsevered and its terminological application of ‘male’ and 
‘female’ persist towards plotting out the same sort of anatomical dimorphisms.23 In contrast to 
the macro model, however the micro model rejects sex as naturally holistic. No longer are female 
and male deemed indivisible or in rigid opposition to each other, they now possess a potential 
coexistence within an individual embodiment. By Killermann’s conceptualization, the category 
of sex elementally consists of a parallel correspondence between a continuum of ‘female-ness’ 
and a continuum of ‘male-ness’ (see Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1: The continua of biological sex.24 
                                                 
21 Sam Killermann, A Guide to Gender: The Social Justice Advocate’s Handbook (Austin: Impetus Books, 2017), 
66-67. 
22 Ibid., 85. 
23 Ibid., 74. 
24 Ibid., 291. 
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The leftmost end of each continuum represents the complete lack of its respective sex 
categorization. As one moves rightward, the degree of occupancy to an embodiment of either 
male-ness or female-ness augments accordingly. The marking of a placement upon each of the 
two axes serves then to indicate a different configuration of bodily sex.25 In no sense, however, 
do these continua negate the category of sex from figuring female and male as ontologically 
rooted positions. Quite to the contrary, Killermann’s continua invigorate the ontological 
foundation for ‘intersex’, a newly legitimized positioning which by past understandings, Stoller’s 
included, was deemed strictly occupiable as a biological defect.26 Killermann details, 
If someone has all the characteristics of male anatomical sex, we may consider them to be 
‘male’. If someone has all the characteristics of female anatomical sex, we may consider 
them to be ‘female’. And if someone has characteristics associated with both sexes, we 
may consider them to be ‘intersex’.27 
 
Charting how each of these might appear on the two continua, the position of male would 
involve graphing female-ness at a stark zero and male-ness at any positive placement (the 0 : x 
ratio makes the specific value male-ness inconsequential). Vice versa applies to the position of 
female. As for the position of intersex, its graphing consists of a simultaneity in positivity along 
both the female-ness continuum and male-ness continuum.  
 In utter contrast to sex, however, gender assumes a drastically dissimilar 
conceptualization under Killermann’s individual-oriented model than it does under the model of 
the socially oriented distinction. The activist chiefly addresses gender in its form of gender 
identity. As Killermann defines it,  
Gender identity is how you, in your head, experience and define your gender, based on 
how much you align (or don’t align) with what you understand the options for gender to 
be.… Gender identity is all about how you think about yourself. It’s about how you 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 96. 
26 Stoller, 9. 
27 Killermann, 120. 
14 
internally interpret your personal chemistry in the face of the socialization you experienced 
growing up.28 
 
Thus, gender identity in this context harks back to Stoller rendering of the psychological side of 
the distinction as characterized in part by gender’s internalized subjectivization. Here too 
Killermann figures the category in question as derivable from two parallel continua, with ‘man-
ness’ and ‘woman-ness’ replacing ‘male-ness’ and ‘female-ness’ as the corresponding axes for 
gender identity (see Fig. 2).  
 
Figure 2: The continua of gender identity.29 
The conceptual mechanics of these new continua work just like those of sex, except they 
illustrate a psychological relationality instead one of a biological sort. Hence, different chartings 
yield different configurations of subjectivities, which in turn yield different positions of gender 
identity.30 So, mirroring the sexed criteria for subject establishment, the plotting of both a 
positive value on the woman-ness continuum and a value of zero on the man-ness continuum 
qualifies an occupancy of the position ‘woman’, and vice versa for an occupancy of ‘man’.31 
Other charting configurations besides these two additionally yield a number of “genderqueer” 
positions such as ‘agender’ (occurs when both continua rest at zero) and ‘bigender’ (occurs when 
both continua are positively valuated).32 
 In considering the deeper implications of subject positioning pertinently operating within 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 72 
29 Ibid., 291. 
30 Ibid., 97. 
31 Ibid., 137 
32 Ibid. 134-136. 
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the realm of gender, it becomes apparent just how strikingly dissimilar the micro model’s 
conception of gender is from that of its macro counterpart. Under an individual oriented 
schematization, gender assumes its own form of foundational ontology, one based uniquely upon 
gender identity’s function of subjectivization. This ontologizing of the psychological indeed 
marks a break from past understandings; as by the notions of the prior model, gender had no 
being. Being was strictly reserved, rather, as a property belonging to the biological realm of sex. 
Consequent to the expansion of being’s delimitation, gender furthermore obtains its own set of 
ontologically grounded positions. However, the means of this obtainment come not through an 
act of generation, but one of appropriation. ‘Woman’ and ‘man’, what were once occupiable as 
the positionings of sex, serve now exclusively as the psychological positionings of gender 
identity. They inevitably lose their prior contextualization as resting upon an anatomical 
fundament, and likewise their respective synonymities with ‘female’ and ‘male’ undergo a total 
dissociation. At the site of the individual then, two ontologized categories with their own 
positional sets effectively emerge: the category of sex, with its exclusive biologically rooted 
positions of ‘male’, ‘female’, and in some cases ‘intersex’; and the category of gender, with its 
exclusive psychologically rooted positions of ‘man’, ‘woman’, and in some cases those of the 
genderqueer. Thus is the composition of the individually oriented model of the sex/gender 
distinction.   
16 
PART III 
COLLAPSING THE MICRO MODEL 
 
 
Having outlined both the macro and micro models of the sex/gender distinction, we shift 
now towards explicating the inoperability of this divisionary conception in the form of a critique. 
The contestment presented refutes both the macro and the micro model the distinction, as well as 
previously drafted criticisms directed towards each that exemplify common deficiencies in the 
distinction’s conventional refutation. Working temporarily backwards from their order of 
paradigmatic establishment, the micro model will be the first of these demonstrated as untenably 
schematized.  
 In outline of its structure, the micro model relies upon a pyramidical organization of 
stratified contexts. At the top of this pyramid is the context of the micro model itself, with its 
contrast being towards that of the macro model. Moving down a stratum, the micro model splits 
into the two divided contexts of ‘gender’ and ‘sex’, which of course are distinguished as 
categories of either a psychological or biological character respectively. Moving down once 
more within each of these divided contexts, at which point one happens upon the pyramid’s base, 
one reaches a context subsisting of these categories’ specific positions (male and female for sex, 
man and woman for gender). Now, one cannot overemphasize the importance of positioning 
serving as a base here. The micro model ultimately requires it to viably operate, lest the whole 
structure collapse in on itself. This relevance of positioning stems from inherent segregative 
function of both gender and sex as categories. On the former, Donna Haraway remarks how 
“‘[g]ender’ is at the heart of constructions and classifications of systems of difference.”33 On the 
                                                 
33 Haraway, 130. 
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latter, Martine Rothblatt describes its current operation as a form of apartheid, and that “[i]f there 
are no hard and fast sex types, then there can be no apartheid of sex.”34 Even in looking to these 
categories’ etymologies, gender and sex originate from words definitionally referential towards 
division. ‘Sex’ comes most probably from the Latin word secare, meaning ‘to cut’ or ‘to  
divide’.35 As for ‘gender’, it comes from the Latin word genus, meaning ‘sort’ or ‘kind’.36 This 
segregative characteristic indeed endures within the micro model of the sex/gender distinction. 
One’s categorization on both sides of the distinction necessitates a specific compartmentalized 
occupancy. That an individual could elude specificity as to be simply of a ‘general sex’ or a 
‘general gender’ is entirely incomprehensible. The categories of both gender and sex then 
operationally segregate those of particular biological and subjunctivized constitutions into 
specific positions. However, mere segregation only rudimentarily uncovers positioning’s 
significance. If the sex/gender distinction requires a specificity to its categorizations via a 
segregating of positions, then the very parameters of these segregated positions themselves 
sustain micro model’s contextual strata. Sex, as tied contextually to the biological, must 
accordingly divide along the biological. Gender, as tied contextually to the psychological, must 
accordingly divide along the psychological. Out from these divisions emerge both a set of 
positions strictly encompassed within sex and a set of positions strictly encompassed within 
gender. An absence of territorial overlap is implicit here. Killermann’s own two continua sets 
reflect such exclusivity with the relation between ‘woman-ness’ and ‘man-ness’ schematizing 
gender and ‘male-ness’ and ‘female-ness’ schematizing sex. Furthermore, the higher strata of 
                                                 
34 Martine Rothblatt, The Apartheid of Sex: A Manifesto on the Freedom of Gender (New York: Crown Publishers, 
1995), 19. 
35 Michiel de Vaan, Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic Languages, (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 560-
561.  
36 Mary Hawkesworth, “Confounding Gender,” in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 22, no. 3 (1997), 
657. 
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contexts also rely on this accordance of parameters. There can be no context of a ‘sex/gender 
distinction’ if gender and sex refrain from operating across distinct realms, and there can be no 
context of an individual-oriented modeling of said distinction if distinction itself is lacking.  
Hence, the primary problem comes into view: the necessary maintenance of separation 
across each the micro model’s stratified contexts is ultimately untenable. Critically incorporated, 
Jacques Derrida’s quasi-concept of ‘dissemination’ demonstrates vitally this untenability of 
stabilized contextual segregation. The odd term of ‘quasi-concept’ here follows from its use by 
Eddo Evink. As Evink states “[t]he notion of dissemination can be placed in the line of 
Derridean quasi-concepts…. On the one hand, [quasi-concepts] can be described and thematized, 
although not in a fixed definition, on the other hand, their effects and consequences are variable 
and unpredictable.”37 Said feature of indefinability perhaps outlines dissemination’s operation 
more aptly than would be possible through a mere reductive description, as its incorporative 
saliency pertains to the very impossibility to restrictively define the limits of a word’s 
meaningful signifying capacity. Nevertheless, the following quotation from Derrida provides a 
serviceable framing of the quasi-concept’s complicated workings:   
This is the possibility on which I wish to insist: the possibility of extraction and of citational 
grafting which belongs to the structure of every mark, spoken or written, and which 
constitutes every mark as writing even before and outside every horizon of semiolinguistic 
communication; as writing, that is, as a possibility of functioning cut off, at a certain point, 
from its ‘original’ meaning and from its belonging to a saturable and constraining context.38 
  
We must attend to each of the active elements at play in this key quotation on dissemination, the 
first of these being the ‘mark’. The mark operates in a fashion similar to a word, more 
specifically the Sassurian sign, albeit a word as not inherently treated yet as such. The mark lies 
                                                 
37 Eddo Evink, “Polysemy and Dissemination” in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 43 no. 3 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2014), 274.  
38 Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context” in A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, ed. Peggy Kamuf, trans. 
Alan Bass (New York: Columbia University Press), 97. 
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beneath the word as the inscriptive basis of the word’s own presence. As Niall Lucy clarifies on 
this element of dissemination, “Before a word makes sense, for example, it is a mark – a black 
mark on a white page in the case of a written word. It has to be a mark in order to be a word. But 
once it becomes a word (comes into presence, as it were) it remains a mark; every word is 
always also a mark.”39 Continuing on, Derrida describes ‘extraction’ and ‘citational grafting’ as 
integral in the mark. The processes of these two elements go hand in hand. A mark is first 
appropriated via extraction from an inscriptive context, and then, through grafting, becomes 
citationally reintegrated into a new and different context as a repeated inscription. The continual 
interplay between these three elements of mark, extraction, grafting, propagate the actualization 
of ‘writing’, which in the Derridean sense goes beyond the conventional use of the word to 
include pictographic, hieroglyphic, ideographic, phonetic, and alphabetic content.40  Said 
element of writing holds a capacity of functioning, as Derrida puts it, “before and outside every 
horizon of semiolinguistic communication.” As Evink describes ‘horizon’ as referred to here,   
The horizon is that which lends unity and coherence to the contexts in which phenomena 
appear to us, as well as to the contexts within which texts and other expressions develop 
their meaning. When we interpret a text, we find our starting point in a linguistic, historical 
and cultural horizon that structures beforehand our expectations of the text. On the one 
hand, this horizon limits the possible significations of the text: it cannot mean everything 
at the same time. On the other hand, this limit is very flexible and open; it changes in the 
course of interpretation, which is a dialogue of horizons.41 
 
The consequences of dissemination’s capacity to function in lieu of this horizon are immense. 
The capacity of writing to work outside the constraining zone of a horizon entails its 
emancipation from a signification limit. However, the elimination of limit does not implicate that 
a writing comes to mean everything all at once, but that its meaning as interpretively 
                                                 
39 Niall Lucy, A Derrida Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 2004), 73-74.  
40 Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” 90. 
41 Evink, 269. 
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contextualized within a context can never be reductive. That one finds unity and coherence when 
interpreting a writing, be it in a present or future instance, indicates nothing in relation to the 
writing itself; interpretation begets no intrinsic restriction. Rather, writing itself holds a 
signifying capacity that perpetually eludes what in any context might be stably apparent as 
present.42 Thus, Derrida proclaims, “the force and form of [dissemination’s] disruption explode 
the semantic horizon.”43 By this account, limitations of semiolinguistic communication become a 
non-factor with respects to what a writing might signify. Relating the disavowal of the horizon 
back the processes of extraction and grafting, a number of dissemination’s crucial effects become 
elucidated. First, in the composition of all writing consisting of grafted marks from other 
contexts, “there are only contexts without any center of absolute anchoring.”44 In other words, no 
context operates as its own source of origination, an initial extraction from other contexts is 
required. Second, as following from this lack of center, writing becomes cut off from signifying 
an ‘original meaning’; such a significative capacity would suggest the bunk possibility of a 
writing as irreducibly originative in the first place. Third, no writing escapes from its own 
constitutive marks being extracted for implementation within newly devised contexts. One 
cannot block off parts of a writing from being citationally grafted elsewhere, even if these other 
contexts radically mutate the situating of a mark’s placement relative to other contexts (hence the 
importance of its exploding of the horizon). Finally fourth, as following from this radical 
mutation, writing’s meaning becomes impervious to saturation. The unbridled extractings and 
graftings that continually yield new contexts of writing ever-expand the signifying capacity of 
that which is subject to these processes. This expansion occurs both forwardly, through a citing 
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of marks into newly inscribed meaning-alterative contexts, and recursively, by means of said 
alterations re-schematizing that mark’s meaning at its site of extraction. And with no horizon to 
impose a limit on this swirling of cross-context transferals, writing as disseminated never 
becomes saturated of meanings to convey. With the quasi-concept described and thematized, the 
question arises as to how dissemination problematizes the micro model of the sex/gender 
distinction. Lucy provides us with a sketch of the answer: “the work of dissemination undoes the 
order of things, disrupting the security of borders and regulations and unsettling the solace of 
ideal forms. Dissemination refuses the ontology of presence.”45 Indeed, the disseminative 
undoing of order described here fatally disrupts the borders and regulations essential to micro 
model’s viable operation. Across its presumably closed off contextual sites, a porous 
interworking between a multitude of foundational concepts bars the model from stability; among 
these being the categories of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, the realms of the ‘biological’ and the 
‘psychological’, and the positions of ‘woman’, ‘man’, ‘female’, and ‘male’. In outlining the 
disseminative disruptions that remove the contextual signifying limitations around each of these 
grafted-in concepts, the untenability of the individual-oriented sex/gender distinction comes into 
clarity.  
 The first disruption to investigate pertains to the breaching of ‘female’ and ‘male’ into 
category of ‘gender’. Foundationally, gender under the micro model finds its ground in the 
notion of gender identity, where one assumes and occupied position, recalling Killerman, “based 
on how much you align (or don’t align) with what you understand the options for gender to be.” 
Of particular note, the ‘options for gender’ referred to here actively exclude the positions of 
‘male’ and ‘female’, as these belong strictly to the category of sex. So while ‘woman’, ‘man’, 
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and any configuration of the genderqueer may operate as valid specificities of gender identity, 
the same validity never applies those positions of a sexed contextualization. Gender identity, 
however, does not originate as a conception from Killermann’s own writing; it has been 
extracted from another source and subsequently grafted into the micro model. Said source of 
extraction, while in no sense independent from incorporative graftings of its own, charts back to 
the writing of Stoller, which states the following on the conception in question:  
Gender identity starts with the knowledge and awareness, whether conscious or 
unconscious, that one belongs to one sex and not the other, though as one develops, gender 
identity becomes much more complicated, so that, for example, one may sense himself as 
not only a male but a masculine man or an effeminate man or even a man who fantasies 
being a woman.46 
 
What emerges from this passage signals the first instance of dissemination destabilizing the 
contextual borders of the micro model. To extrapolate, Stoller’s conception of gender identity 
includes not only ‘woman’ and ‘man’ as positional options of possible subjectivation, but also 
‘female’ and ‘male’; that which must qualify exclusively as positionings of sex. Were the context 
of the micro model closed off from all foreign influence, this relayed quotation would in no form 
disrupt the model’s schematization of gender. However, on account of both the disseminative 
impossibility of contextual purity—as evident though the grafting in of ‘gender identity’ here—
and the determinative parameters of identification abiding to whatever can be understood as a 
positional option of gender, this Stoller-derived signification expansion cannot be negated. Thus, 
the positions of ‘male’ and ‘female’ spread from their restrictive category of sex to obtain a 
simultaneous contextual presence in the category where they are supposed to be absent.  
 The impact of recapitulating Stoller, however, goes beyond just the breaching over of 
‘female’ and ‘male’ into a new categorization: it begets the second disseminative disruption.  
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Upon both of these positions achieving a presence within each side of the sex/gender distinction, 
segregative dynamics from the realm of the psychological, what the micro model figures as 
pertinent in a gendered context alone, become active accordingly under a context of sex. In other 
words, sex as a category no longer divides in exclusive terms of biology, but does so in terms of 
psychology as well. Briefly retouching upon the micro model workings of sex, the divisionary 
contingency for each of the category’s positions depends upon biological dimorphisms (e.g. 
chromosomes, genitalia, hormones, etc.). Now, a subtle, yet important, nuance at play here is that 
one need not possess a self-awareness of the dimorphic characteristics of one’s own body for 
said body to occupy a specific sex. Sex operates at the ontological level, thus, as a simple isness 
of a corporeal state, and does so independent of interpretation. So, a graph of a specific position 
of sex, as following the procedure of Killermann’s continua, points not towards an understanding 
of a bodily arrangement, but to the actual anatomical arrangement of the body itself. By 
consequence of this nuance, positions of sex cannot be identified into like those of gender. To 
‘be male’ entails having a male body, ‘female’ a female body, ‘intersex’ an intersex body. 
However, when the disseminative effects upon these positions from the grafting in of Stoller are 
considered, this limitation to identification dissipates completely. As contextually present within 
the category of gender, ‘female’ and ‘male’ become subject to the category’s typical 
psychologically based dynamics of segregation. But such a recontextualization into gender in no 
sense necessitates a decontextualization out of sex. On account of ‘male’ and ‘female’ existing 
within each category simultaneously—and doing so as inscribed in each through the same 
mark—psychologically based segregative dynamics not only affect these two positions while in 
the context of gender, but do so equally while in the context of sex. Unexamined anatomical 
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configuration desists then as the sole ontological foundation for sexed positioning, it operates 
just as surely now upon the self-understood position of one’s own sex itself.  
By initial assessment, this new scheme seems circular. How can sex’s positions be 
determined by their determination if the criterium for this is exactly what is in question? What is 
crucial to recall here is that sex has not lost its ontological sourcing in the body, its foundational 
scheme has just expanded to a multi-realm plurality. That the determination of sex is now in part 
psychological does not negate the initial grounding role of the biological. Hence, the two realms 
interact. Through utilization of psychological faculties, one self-references one’s own biology to 
determine a sexed positioning. An inquiry of, ‘how do I know what my sex is?’ spurs one to 
evaluate the sexually dimorphic corporeal regions of the body in order to satiate this question. 
Whatever conclusion is obtained serves as the occupied position of sex. Critically, no alternative 
locus grants one epistemic awareness of this occupancy. While the body as unevaluated may 
possess a sexed configuration, positional establishment remains an impossibility until an 
evaluation actually occurs. In other words, one cannot specify oneself as positioned in sex unless 
a position is first contemplatively understood as applicable. As a consequence, what yields from 
corporeal self-evaluation comes itself to act as an ontological fundament, one planted outside the 
realm of biological. Much then like how the determination of gender entails an assessment of 
positional options, sex’s determination comes to involve a similar act of assessment, albeit one 
directed towards the body instead of all understandable gender identities. That this assessment 
utilizes psychological faculties does not default it as an operation of gender, however. It is not 
the specificity of a gender positioning being targeted here in this corporeal self-evaluation, but 
strictly the positioning of one’s sex alone. Finding one’s position in gender is a separate inquiry, 
one that takes place in an entirely different categorical context. Thus, the category of sex comes 
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to possess two disparate ontological foundations that situate its respective positionings: the 
biological body itself and this body as psychologically comprehended self-referentially. 
Now, no menacing disruptions to the micro model seem emergent from this addition of a 
psychologically characterized ontology to sex. After all, the psychologically derived positionings 
here remain reliant upon an assessment of the body, meaning the biological upholds its status as 
the category’s realm of divisional primacy. But this status is not guaranteed imperishability. 
Psychology’s presence in sex tears biology from its place of assumed precedence. While indeed 
standardly the body must be evaluated in order to establish a psychologically based position, 
nothing inherently renders the biological as the comparatively more superior foundation to the 
psychological relative to the positionings each produces. The realms are interdependent of each 
other. Without a possessed body to refer to, sex as psychologically grounded becomes 
unstationable; without a contemplation of corporeal configuring, sex as biologically grounded 
becomes uniterable. However, on account of no one realm trumping the other as the category’s 
ultimate ground, nothing incorruptibly cements the biological as operationally antecedent. Causal 
polarity can be reversed. In accordance with such a reversal, sex starts in the activation of one’s 
psychological faculties, coming subsequently to adjust the body into a suitable corporeality. Julia 
Serano’s idea of ‘subconscious sex’ works as an epitome of this polarity switch. Defined by 
Serano as “an unconscious and inexplicable self-understanding regarding what sex one belongs 
to or should be,” subconscious sex supposes not biology, but psychology as the antecedent realm 
of positional establishment.47 One’s embodied anatomical arrangement is superseded by a 
subconscious self-understanding, one that first grounds the positioning of sex upon a 
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psychological fundament.48 Following suit, subconscious sex further dictates a coincident 
positional conformity at the level of the biological.49 Serano understands this requirement of 
positional congruency as the reason why procedures of physical transition for trans individuals 
are therapeutic.50 The body comes accordingly to match a latent, self-understood positioning. 
Whether this psychology-to-biology causality Serano advocates is a more accurate portrayal of 
the operation of sex than a biology-to-psychology rendition is ultimately beside the point 
here.  By the micro model, ‘subconscious sex’ is oxymoronic. Sex supposedly sorts out its 
positions only along the lines the biological, a realm where the subconscious has no belonging. 
Yet were only biology at play in the category, an idea like subconscious sex would be infeasible 
to even conceptualize in the first place. The very capacity to formulate sex as foundationally 
psychological demonstrates a lack of singularity in its divisional factor. With sex now 
segregating nonexclusively under both biological and psychological dynamics, the sex/gender 
distinction decays only further into structural disarray. 
Having mapped out how sex becomes psychologically segregative, we arrive now at the 
third disseminative disruption. Configurally mirroring the first disruption, it consists of the 
breaching of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ into the category of sex. Just as how the micro model grafted in 
‘gender identity’ from a contextual elsewhere, so too by this same procedure did ‘man’ and 
‘women’ enter its conceptual scheme. However, rather than this integration being trackable to a 
specific textual source, as was relationally the case to Stoller, the two positions in question 
instead derive from the macro model of the sex/gender distinction. ‘Man’ and ‘woman’ under 
this model once served unquestionably as sexed positionings, but this changed with the micro 
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model’s advent. Appropriated and re-schematized, they were delimited out of the context of sex 
to become lodged exclusively within context of gender. By the effects of dissemination, 
however, this aim towards contextual delimitation proves utterly futile. ‘Woman’ and ‘man’ 
hauntingly endure as positionings of sex in spite of all contemporary efforts to shed this past 
conception. Even those subscribed to the micro model fail in confining them to a gendered 
context. An analysis from Killermann on the workings of sexism immaculately exemplifies this 
failure. While discussing the aim of feminist politics, the activist states the following:   
The thing feminism thinks is bad is the hundreds of years of sexism …, as well as the 
existence of sexism today. Sexism is the problem—sexism that a lot of men engage in and 
a lot of women internalize. Men engage in sexism because they’ve been taught to 
behave/think that way. Women internalize it for the same reason. Feminism asks both men 
and women to critically think about those normalized behaviors and their impact and holds 
people accountable to sexist thinking and behavior even if they didn’t initially realize it 
was sexist.51 
 
A variety of tensions come into focus out of this passage. If, by Killermann’s assessment, 
“feminism, distilled down to its absolute core, is about gender equity,” the question arises as to 
why feminists posit the social malaise of sexism as their primary target of critique.52 Also 
questionable here is the relational role at play between this malaise and the positions of woman 
and man. Purportedly, men engage in sexism and women internalize it, yet nothing indicates the 
recipient of this engagement for man nor the impetus of this internalization for woman. An 
adherence to the established parameters of the micro model entails this impetus and recipient be 
categorized as sexed, but not only does this clash with the asserted directive of feminism towards 
establishing gender equity, it leaves inexplicable why woman and man, being without an 
inherent connection to sex, execute such disparate actions from each other under sexism’s 
influence. Interpreted alternatively, the selected object of each position’s action is the other 
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gender position itself. Hence, woman suffers as the recipient of man’s sexist engagements, and 
man originates as the impetus of woman’s sexist internalizations. While this much more sensible 
interpretation does resolve the contradictions iterated, it does so only to produce one anew, for 
woman and man now exit their purely gendered classification to obtain a coexistent belonging to 
the realm of sex. 
What do these tensions indicate in being present? Were the contextual border of the 
micro model sufficiently secure, ‘sexism’ should possess zero referentiality to matters 
concerning ‘woman’ and ‘man’. The conflictual relations between these positions ought to be 
problematized exclusively via a term like ‘genderism’ (which, while infrequently used, is in fact 
an already coined concept).53 Likewise, issues of sexism ought to pertain strictly to sex’s own 
respective positionings. However, not only are neither of these securing measures utilized here 
by Killermann, virtually no one takes such measures of security. The activist’s description of 
feminism as vying to combat sexism towards an establishment of gender equity succeeds 
faultlessly in portraying the discipline’s current political telos, it by no means is 
misrepresentative. Yet simultaneously, it also exposes a pervasive contradiction in contemporary 
feminism's base conceptions. ‘Contemporary’ noteworthily is the key word here. The feminism 
of the macro model posited ‘man’ and ‘woman’ as sexed positions, opposed sexism in terms of 
said positionings, and sought equity by a factor of sex.54 Hence, the conceptual wielding of 
sexism proved non-contradictory under this schematization. The micro model’s consistent usage 
of sexism towards the same positional marks, albeit with them now problematically posited into 
gender, indicates the extracting of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ from the older socially oriented model.  
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Consequently subjected to a contextual breaching, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ thusly obtain a dual 
positioning within both categories of sex and gender. 
 The configural mirror withstanding, the fourth and final disruption from dissemination 
works inversely to that of the second. Akin to the infiltration of ‘male’ and ‘female’ into gender 
initiating the flow of the psychological into sex, the infiltration of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ into sex 
initiates the flow the biological into gender. Another passage from Killermann proves assistive 
here, its topic relating this time to the issue of bathrooms. Responding to the contemporary 
controversy over who appropriately belongs in each of the two segregated public restroom 
facilities, Killermann proposes an eliminative solution to this issue of public space by advocating 
for their re-signifying as ‘all-gender restrooms’ (See Fig. 3).  
 
Figure 3: All-gender Restroom sign.55 
The activist posits indiscriminate inclusion as the dispelling remedy to this controversy so as to 
account for those aforementioned genderqueer positions falling outside the gender binary. 
Killermann explains,  
When it comes to shared restrooms, there are laws in place … that set strict building 
standards related to men’s and women’s restrooms. These laws exclude folks who don’t fit 
within that binary, and those who identify with a third gender. So changing them, and 
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finding workarounds in the meantime, will be necessary to achieve restroom equity on the 
gender front.56 
 
While by an initial assessment nothing here appears to disturb the operations of the micro model, 
a noxious confoundment becomes clear upon further investigating how this remedial 
transformation towards all-gender restrooms relates back to these spaces’ displayed signage and 
constructive design. As Killermann notes, present day restroom segregation allocates two 
divided areas: the men’s room and the women’s room. By the micro model, these divided spaces 
ought to suit those of a congruent positioning in gender; the men’s room is designed for those 
gendered as men, the women’s room for those gendered as women. In accordance with this 
presumption, the segregation in effect works thusly along an axis of gender. This notion of 
public restrooms as zones fundamentally separated by gender, however, utterly errs in what it 
attributes to segregating these spaces. Not gender, but a biologically rooted macro model 
conception of sex underpins restrooms’ binary arrangement. As Christine Overall attests of this 
reattribution, “I take the segregation of public toilets as a … custom of sex segregation. A 
particular person is expected to use the women’s toilets, not because that person may act in a so-
called feminine manner (some men do and some women don’t) but rather because that person 
has, or is thought to have, a vulva and a vagina.”57 Further evidencing the biological basis of 
restroom division, the constructive design difference between the spaces accommodates strictly 
for anatomical discrepancies.  As Alex Schweder remarks, “Public bathrooms, as conventionally 
constructed today, are based on a Freudian model, where women’s bodies are men’s bodies that 
lack a penis. Conventional women’s rooms are basically men’s rooms without urinals. The 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 166. 
57 Christine Overall, “Public Toilets: Sex Segregation Revisited,” in Ethics & the Environment 12, no. 2 (2007), 75. 
31 
absence of female urinals in public spaces emphasizes women’s lack of a penis.”58 No way 
detracting from this astute observation of men’s rooms as phallocentric, a slight addendum to 
Schweder’s assertion proves the construction of women’s restrooms presumes an exclusive 
genital possession. Within these spaces are accommodations made for those who menstruate, 
while in the men’s room there are none such accommodations whatsoever.59 The division of 
restrooms by ‘woman’ and ‘man’ thusly pertains not, as implicated by the micro model, to a 
subjectivized position of gender, but, as in congruency with the macro model, to an anatomical 
position of sex.  
By the effects of this schematic residue from the macro model, Killermann’s solution of 
creating all-gender restrooms fatally complicates the micro model’s operations. Incredibly 
simple in its devising, the activist’s de-segregative tactic involves merely replacing the ‘Men’ 
and ‘Women’ signage displayed outside each space with the sign pictured in Figure 3.60 The 
interior construction of these spaces, however, is left entirely unaltered. Like the 
problematizations presented by the contradictory utilization of sexism, an adherence to a micro 
model logic in analyzing the effects of all-gender restrooms reveals crippling deficiencies across 
multiple interpretations. Abiding to the conception of gender as based in subjectivity, to revise 
the signage in the described manner transforms public restrooms into exasperatedly 
dysfunctional spaces. Some further explanation of this claim is required. All restrooms, even as 
segregated currently, are themselves already “all-gender.” For example, nothing prevents one of 
a genderqueer identification from entering the women’s or men’s room, insofar as said 
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individual’s anatomy complies to the established anatomical restrictions of the space. The men’s 
room accommodates genderqueer people with a penis and its related dimorphisms, and the 
women’s room accommodates genderqueer people with a vagina and its related dimorphisms. 
Granted, while indeed within public restrooms a policing of ambiguous or deviant presences 
occurs upon the basis of one’s interactable public appearance, such as, to use J. Jack 
Halberstam’s famous scenario, when butch females in the women’s room are accused of being in 
the wrong space, this policing aims to reify spatial segregation by a measure of biology alone.61 
Interrogations of deviant presences seek not to elucidate a hidden positioning privately based in a 
subjective interior, but a hidden sexual anatomy concealed under the exterior garb of a 
confounding appearance.62 Changing the signage of restrooms to ‘all-gender’ then serves only as 
a superfluous reversal of the present order. The previously implicit permittance of all genders 
within each space becomes explicit through the spaces’ signage, while the previously explicit 
segregation of each space by biological sex becomes implicit through the spaces’ architecture. 
Considering the relation between signage and space, however, this reversal leaves public 
restrooms utterly dysfunctional. The identicality in indicative display means one cannot discern 
which sex belongs in which room until first entering. Upon doing so, the selection made will be 
either correct, at which point the room entered will have to be committed to memory for the 
event of future uses, or incorrect, meaning one now is embarrassingly in the wrong restroom and 
highly likely to be reprimanded. 
The sheer nonsensicality and inapplicability of this solution demands an alternative. The 
following works far more sensibly: when Killermann proposes for the instatement of ‘all-gender 
restrooms’, said proposal is not in pursuit of the open permittance of gender identities within 
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these spaces, this is already the current state of things. Rather, the ‘all’ of ‘all-gender’ entails the 
open permittance of all variations of biological embodiment. Each restrooms’ interior design 
difference refrains then from indicating the anatomical configuration appropriate to each space. 
Penis or no penis, vagina or no vagina, one of any gender positioning may access every room 
without hindrance. While this interpretation indeed produces a more practical result, an 
advocation for the free flow of bodies throughout biologically segregated spaces via the mark of 
‘gender’ results in this category’s critical undermining. On account of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ being 
categorized under the micro model as belonging to gender, Killermann’s remediation abides to 
this categorization accordingly—hence the specific proposal for a conversion towards an ‘all-
gender’ signage instead of a more commonplace, yet equally neutralizing, ‘unisex’ signage. Due 
to the segregative zoning of restrooms operating upon an anatomical conception of these 
positionings, however, gender departs from its pure placement within the psychological to obtain 
co-occupancy within the realm biology. Far more than mere issues of public space are at stake in 
this departure. Whether Killermann’s remediation receives an actualized implementation is 
utterly irrelevant; this call for ‘all-gender restrooms’ serves merely a as proposal. But precisely 
this propositional character of the solution thrusts the issue beyond the scope of the any one 
specific scenario. The very arriving by the activist to a remediation that imbues gender with 
biological dynamics attests to the category’s contextual looseness. As was the case with 
‘subconscious sex’, were there a working contextual security in place, this remediation would be 
inconceivable and un-formulatable. Unlike any conception of psychological sex, however, what 
emerges from biological gender follows no special procedure of its own, no convoluted 
equivalent to corporeal self-referencing or causality reversal. The direct grafting in of ‘man’ and 
‘woman’ from sex under the macro model means biological gender’s positional establishments 
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possess no operative differentiation from those of their extractional source. In other words, the 
divisional dynamics between these categories are completely indistinguishable, save for their 
relationality to other the facets of their respective models. Hence, the diffusive effects of 
dissemination once again dilapidate the sex/gender distinction into greater ruin.  
Having reviewed in full all four disseminative destabilizations, we obtain at last the 
possibility to look towards their combined impact upon the sex/gender distinction. Before doing 
so, however, an assessment of the often neglected ‘intersex’ and ‘genderqueer’ positions is first 
warranted. Said assessment will act as a prelude to the direct explanation of the distinction’s 
collapse into untenability. Now, two factors make the positions of ‘intersex’ and ‘genderqueer’ 
unique by comparison to those of male, man, female, and woman. First, the very structure of 
their names connects them directly to their category of occupancy. Intersex belongs evidently to 
the realm of sex, genderqueer belongs evidently to the realm of gender. Second, the segregative 
function of each category that produces their specific positionings does not explicitly generate 
the two positions in question. ‘Genderqueer’ and ‘intersex’, rather, rely upon a referential 
interrelation between said explicitly produced positions. As Jennifer Germon notes on the 
inherent interlacing of ‘female’ and ‘male’ in the latter, “‘Inter’ literally means between: thus to 
be intersexed is to fall between the two legitimate sex categories.”63 Likewise, on the former, 
with respects to ‘man’ and ‘woman’, Alyson Escalante remarks, “To take on [a genderqueer] 
identity in a rejection of the gender binary is still to accept the binary as a point of reference. In 
the resistance to it, one only reconstructs the normative status of the binary.”64 Even 
Killermann’s own continua based understanding affirms this reliance upon interrelation, as the 
                                                 
63 Germon, 171. 
64 Alyson Escalante, “Gender Nihilism: An Anti-Manifesto,” in What is Gender Nihilism? A Reader (Contagion 
Press, 2016), 313. 
35 
mapping of ‘intersex’ necessitate a dual positivity in male-ness and female-ness, and the 
mapping of ‘genderqueer’ requires the same in woman-ness and man-ness.  
By the sum of these two factors then, one might assume conceptual solidity within these 
unique positions. But in recalling the multitude of disseminative disruptions destabilizing gender, 
sex, and their jumble of specificities, ‘genderqueer’ and ‘intersex’ are shown as slipping outside 
their schematized realms. ‘Man’ and ‘woman’ subsist as simultaneous positions of sex in 
addition to gender; ‘male’ and ‘female’ as positions of gender in addition to sex. This 
crisscrossing disastrously complicates the interrelationality necessitating the two positions in 
question. If, for instance, ‘genderqueer’ inherently operates in reference to ‘man’ and ‘woman’, 
and ‘man’ and ‘woman’ now are categorized under sex, it follows that ‘genderqueer’ accordingly 
joins this category of sex in correspondence to its interrelative positionings. The inverse 
conclusion applies in what happens to ‘intersex’ in ‘female’ and ‘male’ entering gender. Thus, 
each assumes a paradoxical constitution: ‘intersex’ becomes a gender, and ‘genderqueer’ 
becomes a sex. All categorical appropriateness has been brazenly transgressed. Alternatively, the 
maintenance of the positions within their appropriate categories remains a possibility, albeit one 
no less plagued with complications. Using ‘intersex’ as the example this time, if this position 
simply operates via the interrelations of whatever falls within the category of sex, the question 
arises as to how the addition of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ to this category impacts the modes of 
interrelationality. What is ‘intersex’ as figured between man and male or woman and female? 
What about between woman and man? What about between all four at once? The same 
conundrum affects the position of ‘genderqueer’, and one can pose for its own tailored set of 
confounding questions. Without these categories’ segregations dividing binarily, thusly, 
‘intersex’ and ‘genderqueer’ mutate into borderline nebulous conceptions.  
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 What has happened here to these two specific positions microcosmically reflects the 
inevitable fate of the sex/gender distinction as a whole. By the totalized consequences of 
dissemination’s contextual border disruptions, the divisionary aim of the micro model is shown 
as ultimately untenable. Let us review the totality of border breachings as to justify this assertion. 
By one measure, untenability manifests via a relational disturbance between position and 
category. The categories gender and sex each require their own exclusive set of specific 
positionings; ‘man’ and ‘woman’ being those of gender, ‘male’ and ‘female’ being those of sex. 
The positions, however, unceasingly elude their conceived categorical exclusivity. We find 
‘female’ and ‘male’ unwittingly schematized as belonging to gender, and we find ‘man’ and 
‘woman’ likewise schematized here as belonging to sex. As resulting from this two-way 
positional diffusion across categorical contexts, gender and sex come to possess the same 
arrangement of specific positionings. Position-to-category disturbances are not the only forms of 
annihilative disruption at play here however, significantly active also are disturbances of a 
category-to-realm variety. In addition to their needing of exclusive positions sets, sex and gender 
also require a contextual confining to a single realm of divisionary operation. For sex, this realm 
is the biological, while for gender this realm is the psychological. However, as Raia Prokhovnik 
iterates, “The rich field of ambiguities that the sex/gender distinction evokes is made even more 
complex by the practice according to which ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are often used interchangeably, 
designating the same thing.”65 This factor of interchangeability here marks another form of 
contextual breaching, one that transverses the paramedic realm for each category. ‘Sex’ divides 
not singularly upon biological dynamics, but does so in tandem by dynamics of psychology. 
‘Gender’, meanwhile, divides singularly upon psychological dynamics, but does so in tandem by 
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dynamics of biology.  
 Hence, by the combined impact of these position-to-category and category-to-realm 
disturbances, a final scheme comes into clarity. The micro model’s inherent function of category 
segregation has become violated to the point of complete operational nonviability. In each 
category sharing among themselves the identical position set of ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘male’, and 
‘female’, no tenable distinction can be made between them à la positional exclusivity.  In each 
category holding a simultaneous stationing within both the realms of the psychological and the 
biological, no tenable distinction can be made between them à la exclusive segregative 
dynamics. All borders of categorical separation breached, sex and gender conflate into 
indistinguishability. The pyramid collapses, thus illustrating the ultimate untenability of the 





COLLAPSING THE MACRO MODEL 
 
 
In response to the ruin of the micro model, a remedial return to the macro model might 
arise as a first impulse. After all, the failure of one schema does not necessitate the inherent 
untenability of sex/gender distinction in its alternative formulations. Given its exclusivity of all 
positionings to category of sex, the previously paradigmatic macro model would lack the 
problem of position breaching persistent throughout its contemporary counterpart. Furthermore, 
in gender under the older model dividing relationally by terms of femininity and masculinity, this 
category’s bifurcation operates entirely differently from that of sex’s own. Such differences in 
conceptual structure would mean a difference in conceptual dynamics. Hence, one might be 
tempted to posit the key to a viable sex/gender distinction within understandings past, entailing a 
revival effort to revert back to this past scheme. However, no such reversion to times prior offers 
a conception of the distinction any less of a fiasco than what paradigmatically dominates 
presently. The critique turns, thus, towards demonstrating the ultimate untenability of macro 
model schema. On account of many of the same affective factors of destabilization for the micro 
model making here a reoccurrence, this section will be substantially shorter than the one prior.  
 In the factor of dissemination holding primary responsibility for collapsing the micro 
model, the question arises as to whether this same factor bars the macro model from tenability. 
Already we have seen how the complex of a systematized distinction model proves feeble as a 
measure of protection from contextual border crossing, this being evident in ‘man’ and ‘woman’ 
entering ‘sex’ under the micro model on account of their like categorical placement in the macro 
context. Yet a remedial pursuit of the old distinction schema assumes within such a complex a 
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status of security, but only so by a factor of the temporal. In accordance with said factor, the lack 
of conflation between ‘gender’ and ‘sex’, as abiding to macro model formulations, during the 
second wave indicates the latent undermining contradictions of the present-day model as purely 
contemporaneously contingent. In other words, the lack of category contradictions in the late 
20th century when macro model was paradigmatic means the issue lies not in the distinction 
itself, but its specific individual-oriented rendition as the micro model. So via returning to a past 
conceptual schematization historically demonstrated a unproblematically operational, the 
sex/gender distinction ought, from an advocate standpoint, to be impervious to both internal 
contextual breachings between its own categories, as due to its unmistakable differentiation in 
categorical segregative dynamics, and external contextual breachings between other models, as 
due to its preceding the micro model developmentally and its record of operability.  
 This revivalist pursuit, however, is grounded in nothing but bleary naivety. Foolishly it 
underestimates the viral extents to which dissemination can effectively cripple a supposedly 
stable system. No temporal back tracing through the nostalgic revitalizing of antique 
understandings offers escape from the quasi-concept’s destabilizations, for disseminative 
disruptions break from time’s linear confines. The following Derrida passage on the nuances of 
grafting help elucidate this point:   
It is the sustained, discrete violence of an incision that is not apparent in the thickness of 
the text, a calculated insemination of the proliferating allogene through which the two texts 
are transformed, deform each other, contaminate each other’s content, tend at times to 
reject each other, or pass elliptically one into the other and become regenerated in the 
repetition, along the edges of an overcast seam. Each grafted text continues to radiate back 
towards the site of its removal, transforming that, too, as it affects the new  
territory.”66 
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Understanding that ‘text’ here is procedurally analogous to Derrida’s previously articulated 
notion of ‘writing’, we find dissemination flows bidirectionally. By one trajectory, the grafting in 
of a mark to a new context brings with it the potentiated significations of its extractional source. 
Through the irrepressible resurfacing of said significations, thus, dissemination disrupts newly 
devised writings in all limitative contextual efforts towards interpretive finitude. As exemplified 
in the micro model, a grafting in of ‘gender identity’ lead to ‘male’ and ‘female’ obtaining an 
unbecoming positional placement in the category of gender. Likewise, the model’s grafting in of 
‘woman’ and ‘man’ similarly resulted in these two positions violatively breaching over into the 
category of sex. As for the other trajectory, this disseminative flow works through an opposite 
orientation. Instead of disruption emerging from extractionally sourced significations affecting 
the contextual site of citational grafting, significations produced from this very graft-based site 
come to recursively disrupt the context of extractional origin. A mark, thusly, does not solely 
accumulate potentiated meanings throughout its progressively perpetuated re-inscriptions; 
accumulation infects a mark as a totality, as within every instance of its contextual deployment 
irrespective to temporal sequentiality.  
The bidirectional character of dissemination ultimately eliminates the macro model as a 
tenable solution to redeeming of sex/gender distinction. Mobile across time, dissemination 
disrupts the borders of mark-sharing contexts indifferent to a context functioning as the past site 
antecedently extracted from or the present site subsequently grafted into. For the macro model 
specifically, this mobility negates all temporally rooted measures of defense against cross-system 
intrusions of micro model significations. It matters not that the distinction operated contradiction 
free operation during the milieu of the second wave, not even the most extreme and thorough 
revivalist measures can reconstruct the innumerable aspects that granted this milieu schematic 
41 
tenability in the first place. Deeming a contemporaneously reinstated macro model as operating 
wholly without deviation from how it used to in the past debases said model to the status of a 
shoddy anachronism. Over fifty years have passed since this era of noncontradiction. Since then, 
a whole bounty of strange new additive meanings have taken up residency within the constitutive 
marks of the macro model’s structure. It matters not, furthermore, that these newly added 
meanings cluster contextually under the scheme of the micro model, nor that this new model 
chronologically developed out of the macro model itself. Just as how a bringing forth of the past 
in its unabridged wholeness to the standpoint of the present exceeds all procedural possibility, so 
too is it impossible to leave behind the wholeness of the present to return to a past standpoint 
having already occurred. Hence, revitalizing the distinction to its former state inherently requires 
one do so from the vantage of the here and now. Such a vantage, however, never stands outside 
the total shifts of contextual mutation. The restoring of the macro model to prominence does 
nothing to erase from existence the contradicting conceptual formulations begotten from its 
micro counterpart. The past temporal point of the second wave era inaccessible, the models can 
only coexist with each other; an arrangement no different from what currently is in place with to 
micro model as paradigmatic. Both schemas now in an inescapably contiguous relation at the 
same temporal point of the present, the macro model loses all protection from its shared marks 
with the micro model succumbing to a graft-sourced infusion of signification. Dissemination, 
thusly, disrupts the security of contextual borders just as potently flowing in a macro-to-micro 
direction as it does in a micro-to-macro trajectory. 
Connected now to its already fully corrupted counterpart, the macro model undergoes a 
similar disintegrative crisscrossing that inevitably leads to its structural collapse. The first 
effective disruption of dissemination towards this distinction stems from a breaching of ‘man’ 
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and ‘woman’ from the micro model into the macro model category of ‘gender’. As previously 
explained, these two positions were first extracted from the socially oriented model’s category of 
‘sex’ and then grafted into individual-oriented model’s category of gender. The ties of ‘woman’ 
and ‘man’ to their appropriated from category leads to these positionings subsequently gaining a 
dual placement in the micro model as both gendered and sexed. But with regards to the macro 
model, a different effect yields from its own positions being grafted into a new context. The ideal 
schematization of macro model delimits positioning as exclusively viable under the categorical 
context of ‘sex’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ included. ‘Gender’ for this scheme lacks such viability. 
However, post-grafting into the micro model, ‘gender’ comes also to gain positional viability, 
albeit as contextually bordered off from the macro model. Hence, dissemination activates. The 
sharing of the marks ‘woman’ and ‘man’ between each schema gives ‘gender’ as operating under 
micro dynamics a channel for recursively entering the macro model context. Accordingly, the 
category of gender itself under this model becomes dualistic in its segregative dynamics, 
dividing both along its ideal terms of masculinity and femininity and in micro model’s own 
positional terms of ‘man’ and ‘woman’. Gender now imbued with positional potential, the same 
previously outlined progression of border disruptions initiates once again within the macro 
context: ‘male’ and ‘female’ breach over into gender, causing psychological/cultural dynamics to 
begin segregating under sex; ‘woman’ and ‘man’, already dually positioned in category, cause 
biological dynamics to begin segregating under gender. What results as the finalized schema 
from this sequence of crisscrossings corresponds precisely with the fate of micro model: gender 
and sex become categorically indistinguishable. All revivalist pursuits towards re-erecting the 
macro model are then totally snuffed. No alternative salvational recourse towards tenability thus 






 Standing now in the ruins of the collapsed distinction, we find ourselves faced with a 
question most dire: how ought we to restructure the conceptual fragments of this shattered 
system? The untenability of categorical separation between sex and gender leaves their plethora 
of once constitutive positions orphaned and without organization. As already evidenced, merely 
constructing of a new distinction model to put these positions into is inherently bound to fail, for 
no model possesses the immunity necessary for evading dissemination’s system undermining 
disruptions. Hence, a schematic structure of a radically new sort must be created, one organizing 
of the distinction’s conceptual fragments yet simultaneously compensative towards the 
inevitability of disseminative destabilization. Towards the actualization of such a structure, I 
propose the neologism of gendersex. To summarize the neologism, gendersex operates not as a 
category that rigidly borders off positions from each other in accordance with a certain 
segregative dynamic, but as an all-engulfing amalgam that amorphously arranges positions into a 
dynamically multiplicitous cellular configuration. In other words, the neologism takes all the 
fragments of the collapsed sex/gender distinction and makes from them a single, solitary 
structure parametrically lacking in hard contextual boundaries. 
It might prove helpful to first outline what gendersex is not before further detailing its 
operations in positive terms. For starters, gendersex does not reside at the top of the distinction’s 
pyramidal structure as a sort of capstone category that contains beneath it the other categories of 
‘sex’ and ‘gender’. The neologism’s structure assumes this pyramid having collapsed entirely. 
Thus, said structure contains within itself neither ‘sex’ nor ‘gender’, for both of these are 
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necessitated as conflated into untenability for gendersex to effectively operate. Furthermore, 
gendersex is not simply a crude sticking together of ‘gender’ with ‘sex’. Other scholars grappling 
with this same issue of categorical inseparability have already resorted to this procedure, and 
what results conceptually from their efforts ends up counterproductively reifying the distinction. 
Jennifer Germon is one exemplary scholar subscribed to this procedure, “One of my aims is to 
try where possible to refuse the sex/gender distinction. In order to signify that refusal I use a 
hyphenated form that appears on the page as sex-gender.”67 Nina Lykke poses as another notable 
example, “In line with my use of Feminist Studies as a broad umbrella term and my intentions to 
avoid easy fixations, in casu the fixation of a dichotomy between gender and sex, … I shall use 
the consciously ambiguous term ‘gender/sex’.”68 In investigating the commonalities between 
‘sex-gender’ and ‘gender/sex’, one finds within each of these new concepts the incorporation of 
a conjunctive punctuation mark. Both ‘/’ and ‘-’ work respectively to stitch together the once 
exclusively divided categories of the distinction into a unified conceptual whole, one where 
‘gender’ and ‘sex’ default unavoidably into tandem evaluation. As pertaining to what ultimately 
leads to distinctual reification from these concepts, ‘tandem’ is the key word here. To take ‘sex’ 
and ‘gender’ together in tandem implies a scheme where their separation holds feasibility (the 
very use of ‘sex/gender’ within sex/gender distinction attests exactly to this point). Hence the 
placement of the punctuative stitch lying centrally between the two categories being stuck 
together; without ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ legibly present as marks relationally devoid of contact from 
each other, Germon’s and Lykke’s neologisms lose the referential basis of their conceptual 
wholeness. So, while ‘-’ and ‘/’ indeed function towards unification, they only do so via 
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whatever is becoming unified having an individuated stability of its own, as well as a sufficient 
separative distance from its combinatory counterpart. Thus, ‘sex-gender’ and ‘gender/sex’ do not 
manageably counteract the distinction, they merely further reify it though a supposition of 
categorical non-conflation; as if all the significations coursing throughout ‘gender’ were not just 
as present within ‘sex’ and vice versa. 
 Having described gendersex in negative terms, we turn now towards directly elucidating 
both its compositional structure and subsequent conceptual operations. In contrast to the 
neologisms of Germon and Lykke, gendersex contains no centrally placed conjunctive 
punctuation that stitches together two stably separate categories. ‘Sex’ and ‘gender’ here, rather, 
assume a presence rife with dubiousness. Neither of their marks appear written as properly 
spaced—a quite significant factor in consideration that a mark’s emergence fundamentally 
depends upon its spatial relation to surrounding textual elements.69 One can read within 
gendersex an inscription of both categories, but in absence of a separative stitch, one knows not 
with certainty if such a reading designates properly the site of suture. Who is to say it reads as 
‘gender|sex’ and not ‘genders|ex’ or some other alternative inscription? Having rendered all 
assumptions of implied internal spacing ultimately ambiguous, thus, the consistent kerning of the 
neologism forces one accordingly read it as an uninterrupted, singularized whole.  
Its structure explained, the next aspect of consideration for gendersex pertains to its 
operation as a concept. Now, it would be ultimately hypocritical to try and proclaim that 
whatever operations are listed encompass the totalized potential for the neologism’s deployment. 
Gendersex itself is not immune to the effects of dissemination; I cannot put a stopper on how it 
might be grafted into other contexts. Nevertheless, the following description outlines at least one 
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of many possible conceptual configurations for the neologism. The operational schema of 
gendersex contains three primary aspects. First, gendersex collects the sum of all occupiable 
positions orphaned by the collapse of sex/gender distinction and amalgamates them into a 
singularized totality. Thus, ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘male’, ‘female’, ‘intersex’, ‘genderqueer’, and any 
other conceivably occupiable positioning refrain from being confined to a specific category. 
Rather, gendersex subsumes these positionings in such a way that their resulting amalgamation 
lacks the compartmentalizations of uncrossable contextual borders. Second, as following from 
this lack, gendersex arranges its collected positions into an amorphous cellularized configuration. 
Under the now defunct conceptualization of the distinction, positions were framed as binary pairs 
(e.g. man with woman, male with female). But as a part of gendersex, no form of essentialized 
relational connection, binary included, ties any number of positionings together. Hence, 
positionings obtain a cell-like constitution; maintaining for themselves their own individuation 
from each other, as predicated by the dissimilarity of their marks, yet never assuming a solidified 
overall interrelationality. Ever shifting, the positional cells of gendersex elude conceivability 
with respect to their total configuration, rendering the neologism’s produced arrangement 
thoroughly amorphous in character. Third, and lastly, gendersex applies no inherent dynamic of 
cellularization towards its positions. Acting as a pertinent aspect of sex/gender distinction, 
positional division depends upon a particular categorically contingent segregative dynamic. Said 
division posits for each positioning an essential predicative fundament (e.g. ‘male’ as categorized 
under a biologically segregative sex would itself possesses a biologically characteristic being). 
Gendersex, however, does not abide to this divisional particularity relative to the positions it 
encompasses. Free of all categorical contexts, the neologism’s cellularization establishes for its 
positions a non-essentialized and irreducible foundational ground, one as equally shifty to their 
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amorphous relational configurement. So, to draw from the last used example, ‘male’ within 
gendersex possesses no variety of inherent grounding as either biologically, psychologically, or 
culturally based, but instead are constituted upon a potentiated, non-hierarchical simultaneity of 
all three of these dynamics. Thusly, gendersex opens the fundament of its positionings to 







The operations of gendersex described, the ultimate question relative to the neologism 
concerns how it might be theoretically utilized within scholarship. A reverting to gendersex from 
the conventional scheme of the sex/gender distinction entails a shift in inquiry. All contextual 
borders eliminated, one need not ask ‘what positions belong in which category?’ Abiding to 
gendersex, one might ask instead ‘what are the past, present, or projected configural relationality 
between the sum of these positions?’. Furthermore, instead of asking, ‘what dynamic truly 
characterizes the category of sex’ or ‘what dynamic truly characterizes the category of gender?’ 
one might ask, ‘what does it mean that such disparate dynamics have become infused within the 
same positional marks?’ Lastly, in all positions having become foundationally pluralized, one 
need no longer ask ‘what truly is a woman?’ ‘what truly is a man?’ or any question of a similar 
sort directed towards other positions. One might ask in its place ‘with all of these positions 
foundationally turbulent, what strange conceptualizations wait for them in the future?’ Out from 
such a change in theory, thus, we shift towards a formulation of our milieu that revels in the 
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